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'Irrigation and water management1 is enjoying a fashion in 
development planning circles and international agencies, and 
efforts are being made to step up spending under this heading 
all over Asia. There are good reasons why irrigation will 
continue to get very high priority in strategies to increase 
food production and labour absorption in agriculture, and why 
grants and loans from rich countries will continue to finance 
a large part - currently about a half (Colombo et al. 1977, 
p.XIII) - of irrigation investment in South and Southeast Asia. 
But the plans are being made with too little attention to 
diagnosing the causes of the generally disappointing performance 
of large, publicly-operated canal systems (on which the bulk of 
the irrigation investment will be spent). The problem is not 
that no statement of causes is made, but that one set of causes, 
which we will argue here are indeed very important, are simply 
not considered; they are 'screened out' from consideration from 
the very beginning. The remedies are hence unlikely to have 
the effects expected of them; and when such large amounts of 
resources are being allocated to them, this matters. 
To be more specific: Much of the literature on the causes and 
remedies of poor canal performance in the tropics, though large 
and varied, is characterised by three assumptions, usually 
implicit: (1) that the problems are mainly of a 'technical' rather 
than an 'institutional' nature; (2) that the problems arise mainly 
'below' rather than 'above' the outlet, that is, at the farm 
1. Main system management was described as a 'blind spot' by 
Anthony Bottrall (1978:322) in an article which makes a 
number of the points which are elaborated here. 
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and village level; and (3) that insofar as problems are identified 
as 'institutional1, they relate to the institutions of farmers. 
The meaning and significance of these assumptions can be 
illustrated by examining three recent reports on irrigation 
improvement. All are the work of distinguished specialists 
and all are likely to shape opinion widely in development 
circles and to have direct repercussions on how money for 
irrigation and irrigation-research is allocated. 
Take first the report to the Trilateral Commission (Colombo 
et al., 1977X It proposes a 
fifteen year international programme for doubling rice production 
in South and Southeast Asia, 'focused on irrigation improvement 
as the leading factor in generating production increases' (XIII). 
The report focuses on Asia because two-thirds of the world's 
malnourished people live in this area, and because the 'gap' 
between projected food demand in 1985 and extrapolated food 
production in underdeveloped countries is concentrated in 
rice in Asia. It takes rice because rice is the staple food 
of most of Asia (nearly three quarters of foodgrain consumption), 
and because judging from average yield differences between Japan 
(6 tons per hectare) and South and Southeast Asia (about 2 tons 
per hectare), the potential for yield increases is very large. 
Whereas it took Taiwan and South Korea seme 40 years to double 
their yields of the 1920s, it is thought that countries of South 
and Southeast Asia, which now have yield levels about the same 
as Taiwan and South Korea in the 1920s, can shorten the doubling 
period to about 15 years - given adequate investment in the 
rignt things. 
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To increase rice production irrigation must be expanded and improved. 
As the report says, 'In the case of paddy, controlled supply 
of water is an absolute prerequisite; and modern varieties and 
fertiliser have effects only when there is sufficient water. 
It should be clearly recognised that good water control is the 
single most important factor in increasing paddy yield in Asia 
at this time' (24, emphasis in original). 
How to.increase irrigation? The report gives the results of a 
series of cost calculations for a number of alternatives, 
based on recent experience in Asia. 'In general, all methods 
starting with previously uncultivated land are shown to be not 
advisable, because they cost more and take more time. The lowest 
capital costs for increasing paddy production by 1 ton per hectare 
per year are, first, in improving inadequately-irrigated land 
to adequately-irrigated land and, second, in improving rainfed 
cultivated land to adequately-irrigated land' (XII). 
How to improve inadequately-irrigated land? 'The shift from 
inadequate to adequate irrigation facilities in most cases 
requires primarily digging out farm ditches, maintenance of 
ditches, and good management of water supplies1' (XII). Hence 
irrigation improvement is to be effected' by the construction 
on a huge scale throughout South and Southeast Asia of farm 
ditches to carry water from the canal outlet closer to each 
individual field. (The report suggests a density of 50 metres 
of farm ditches per hectare of cropped area as the dividing 
line between inadequately and adequately irrigated areas, 
p.21) . 
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To achieve this investment the report calls for an increase of 
current annual budgets for irrigation in South and Southeast 
Asia from US$1.7 billion (in 1975 prices) to an annual average 
level over the whole 15 year period to 19 9 3 of $3.6 billion. 
The report thus implicitly adopts the first two assumptions stated 
earlier: that the problems are technical (inadequate physical 
structures), and below the outlet (farm ditches). To be sure, 
the report does emphasise that 'these improvements in water 
control will not automatically and in themselves bring about the 
desired production increases. A wide range of actions will be 
needed, including the critical need to develop rural institutions' 
(XIII). More specifically, the report emphasises the need to 
supplement farm ditch construction with intensified extension 
efforts, and by efforts to develop leadership and discipline 
in the rural community 'to organise its members for the protection 
of their common good and reconciliation of conflicting interests 
Serious extension efforts to organise farmers into such groups 
as irrigators' associations and compact farms should accompany 
the construction of irrigation facilities' (28). The report 
thus also assumes the third general proposition, that the 
needed 'institutional' developments relate mainly to village 
communities. 
Yet on a priori grounds one would expect the reliability and 
adequacy of water supplies delivered by the main system to 
the outlet to be a very important influence on irrigators' 
behaviour and relationships below the outlet. Take farm ditch 
maintenance, for example. The report recognises that the farm 
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ditch programme requires as an essential condition of success 
that the new farm ditches be adequately maintained; but sees 
this wholly as a problem of developing leadership and discipline 
amongst farmers. What is not recognised is the dependence of 
maintenance effort on the adequacy and reliability of supplies 
through the outlet. If the standard of water service falls below 
a certain level, one would expect this to have sharply increasing 
disincentive effects on maintenance effort. Where, on the other 
hand, unlimited supplies of water are available through the 
outlet, this too may lead to poor maintenance - since supplies 
will be ample for all even through poorly maintained ditches. 
Thus farmers will not maintain the ditches unless the government 
runs the canals effectively. And the same point applies to land 
development below the outlet: unless farmers believe the supply 
to the outlet will be adequate and reliable, they are likely 
to resist efforts to make them undertake expensive land shaping 
measures. Indeed, starting with field investigations, several 
authorities have converged on the conclusion that the delivery 
of appropriate and reliable amounts of water to outlets can be 
seen as a precondition for community-level action, including 
land development, field channel maintenance and irrigators' 
Bottrall 1978, 
associations {Rart 1978, Duncan 1978, Wickham and Valera 1978; 
also Wade 1979, Levine 1976, Moore 1979; also Bromley et al. 
1980). 
latter 
This/ proposition shifts attention to the way that the main canal 
system is operated and maintained, and particularly to the 
effectiveness of water control in the delivery system. Effective-
ness is a function of two variables: control capacity, and 
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control utilisation-(Levine 1977). Capacity is a function 
primarily of the physical structures - the gates, cross-regulators, 
measuring devices, canal linings, communication facilities such 
as telephones, radios, and, as the report correctly emphasises, 
farm ditches. However, it is misleading to assume, as this 
and most other reports on irrigation improvement do, that higher 
levels of control capacity will 'automatically' give rise to 
improved utilisation of that capacity by the canal staff, 
resulting in more effective water control to the outlets. 
Utilisation of capacity depends on many complexly interacting 
factors. Some are environmental, such as the percentage shortfall 
in water flow compared to normal - the greater the shortfall 
control 
the greater the utilisation of/capacity is likely to be. Others 
are related to the communications system, to the training.of 
canal staff, to the structure of the irrigation bureaucracy 
through which the operation and maintenance is carried out, and 
to the liaison (or otherwise) between canal staff and irrigators. 
To give an illustration: Canal systems in South Asia are 
operated through large unified bureaucracies. At the top are 
the Ministers, the Secretary for Irrigation, and the Director-
General or Chief Engineer General, the latter with a central 
technical staff for planning and design; all these are located 
in the capital city. At the next level are the regional 
administrations, in the form of Circles, headquartered in regional 
cities or large towns; then the executive units, the Divisions, 
headquartered in or near their command areas; then supervisors, 
foremen, and ditch tenders (or 'bankers'), located in or near 
their jurisdictions within the command areas (Levine 1977). Strict 
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relations of supremacy and subordination are meant to hold 
between levels, the instruments for achieving organisational 
objectives are managed by sets of directives, and the incentives 
for compliance by subordinate units are based simply on conformity 
to orders - with a major asymmetry between small or negligible 
gains for conformity and severe punishment for 'laxity'. This 
form of organisation tends to generate a further asymmetry in 
information flows, as orders, instructions, directives come down 
the hierarchy relatively fast and without distortion, while 
feedback flows are more restricted and liable to distortion 
at each level, as a result both of geographical distance (and 
perhaps class and caste difference) and of the asymmetry in 
incentives and punishments, which prompts subordinates to conceal 
or falsify information passed upwards to protect themselves 
against coercive sanctions. 
When there is little concern amongst farmers or government for 
water use efficiency, this restricted upwards flow of information 
does not matter. India's old rice canals were built at a time 
when concern for water use efficiency was indeed low: there was 
no storage, so the opportunity cost of wasted water was low 
(either the river water was diverted into the canal or it was 
let flow to the sea); and the water-response function of 
traditional varieties was relatively flat, so that canal 
operating policies that resulted in a widely fluctuating supply 
to individual farmers had a relatively small effect on relations 
between farmers and the canal system. In these conditions, 
most of the upward flow of information concerned the security 
of the physical structures, not the needs of farmers and their 
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crops. Today however the concern for water use efficiency is 
much greater, and the value of accurate information about 
what is happening to water supply and crop water demand 
throughout the command area has increased greatly. Eut tiie 
bureaucratic structure and routines of the irrigation staff make 
the collection and transmission of this information upwards 
a major problem limiting the utilisation 
of any given level of water control capacity. 
The main point, then, is this. Canal systems are being designed 
and constructed assuming a level of utilisation of control 
capacity which does not exist in most systems in South and 
Southeast Asia. The problem of poor utilisation cannot be 
solved simply by improving the control capacity, via improved 
or more physical structures. In this respect the Trilateral 
Commission's report is expensively misleading. 
II 
We can now consider more briefly the other two reports, to 
see how they too are shaped by some or all of the three implicit 
propositions stated earlier, therdsy excluding the operation of 
the main delivery system as a problem. 
The World Food and Nutrition Study (National Research Council, 
1977), carried out by the prestigious US National Academy of 
Sciences, gives ample attention to irrigation and water 
management as a priority subject for research. It summarises 
priorities within the subject as: to find ways of 'improving 
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on-farm water management, supplemented by research and develop-
ment on physical improvement and on new planning techniques to 
guide farmers' (p.11). Amplifying, it classifies priorities 
under two headings: (1) 'altering physical conditions to 
provide optimal water supply for maximum crop production' 
(p.90-91), including adjusting tillage and cropping practices 
and 
so that the soil can retain more moisture,/improving irrigation 
technology and related work to improve drainage and salinity 
management; (2) 'adjustment of overall farm management opera tion 
to improve crops under varying conditions of water availability' 
(p.91), including, 'field experiments with plant modelling 
and systems analysis' (p.91). 
In the supporting paper on irrigation, somewhat more attention 
is paid to 'institutional' aspects. For example, the report 
says that the reasons for low water use efficiencies (low per-
centage of water supply which reaches the crop) - typically 
^hich 
near 25 percent but/could technically be at 80 percent - 'are 
complex, but they are more often institutional and economic 
than technical' (vol.2, p.124-5). This promising statement is 
supplemented by general declarations like 'any attempt to choose 
or improve an irrigation design and management programme must 
consider all of the relevant social, economic, political and 
technical conditions', and 'The need is for careful determination 
of optimum management procedures and for innovators' solutions 
to achieve such management levels within local socio-economic 
and physical restraints. These studies must be inter-disciplinary 
in nature and should take into account human and socio-economic 
factors as well as physical and technological ones' (vol.2, 
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p.129). But the relevant social, economic and political conditions 
are never spelled out in any detail, and attention remains 
firmly on those that are technical. 
At only one place in the report is there recognition of the 
dependence of irrigators' practices and behaviour on features 
of the main system above the outlet, and this point is worth 
noting. 'Improvements at the farm-level, depend, .in the case 
of larger water supply systems, on the ability of the farmer 
to obtain water at the time and in the quantity required. 
Thus an important interaction exists between centralised water 
management/planning and on-farm water utilisation. The structure 
of an irrigation system can place severe restraints on the 
irrigator's options to apply sound conventions or innovative 
water management practices' (main report, p.91). What is striking 
about this statement is that while it recognises 'the interaction 
between centralised water management planning and on-farm water 
utilisation', this leads not to a consideration of how the system 
is operated but rather straight into an observation about 
physical structures as a constraint. Indeed, the paragraph comes 
under a section on 'altering physical conditions to provide 
optimal water supply for maximum crop production' (pp.90-91). 
The only other place in the report where institutional aspects 
of irrigation are mentioned is in the paper of the work group 
on 'Rural institutions, policies and social science research'. 
The work group's objective was to analyse 'how US research and 
development could help to strengthen the performance of the 
principal public and private institutions serving agriculture 
in the developing countries ' (vol.3, p.105). Its section on 
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research priorities for water management emphasises 'knowledge 
of water rights and legal rules', 'knowledge of the economic 
and social costs of water, the investments required to make it 
available and to control it', and the cost of failure to 
introduce volumetric pricing of water. It adds that 'political 
scientists can make an important contribution to establishing 
appropriate institutions, as can sociologists and representatives 
of the administrative sciences' (p.122). Again, the nature 
of that potential contribution is not spelt out (in striking 
contrast to the elaboration elsewhere in the report of the 
potential contributions of a large range of natural sciences). 
A report to the International Development Research Council 
(Pereira et al. 1979) on 'Opportunities for increase of world 
food production from the irrigated lands of developing countries' 
similarly restricts its attention almost wholly to technical 
questions. It lists 30 priority topics for research, most of 
which are for the disciplines of physics, chemistry, plant physio-
logy, field engineering, and agronomy. Seven topics are 'socio-
economic ' : 
- 'Economic analysis of yield versus water consumption functions 
and of returns versus total costs for alternative water 
management systems, with a view to defining criteria for 
optimising practices of irrigation, fertilisation, tillage 
and cropping sequences. 
- 'Short-term versus long-term cost-benefit analysis for 
installation of alternative water supply systems.... 
- 'Analysis of water pricing policies in relation to water 
use efficiency and cropping patterns of variously structured 
farming communities. 
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- 'Farm unit size, land tenure and water rights as determinants 
of irrigation and drainage methods. 
- 'Cost-benefit analysis of alternative drainage methods.... 
- 'Definition of credit marketing and infrastructure require-
ments for regional development of irrigation and drainage 
schemes. 
- 'Economic, social and administrative factors affecting the 
motivation of farmers in the sharing of water supplies and 
improvement of water use efficiency...' (39). 
What is missing from this list is reference to research on how 
the main systems are being operated in practice, and of the room 
for improvement in the performance of canal irrigation by means 
of improved working of the administrative hierarchy which 
operates canals. Factors affecting the motivation of farmers 
are to be researched, but not, apparently, those affecting 
the motivation of the people who manage the canals. 
Note finally and incidentally a further clear illustration of 
the third assumption in action: On irrigation in Pakistan, the 
authoritative World Development Report (World Bank, 1978) 
asserts: 'Wasteful water management and poor maintenance can 
be blamed in large part on the hierarchy of social relationships 
among farmers' (para.40). 
Ill 
The blind spot over main system operation is the more surprising 
when one reviews the potential for higher production and more 




This is suggested by / underrealisation of 'irrigation potential'. 
We know of scarcely any case where a major irrigation project 
has provided reliable irrigation for the whole area planned. 
While there are several reasons for this (including unrealisti-
cally high expectations), the most common and significant may be 
the excessive allocation of water to 'topenders' - those in the 
head reaches. What seems to happen is this. In the early 
stages of development of a canal irrigation system, the head-
works are completed and the water supply for the whole system 
is available, but the canals are incomplete. There is thus 
virtually limitless water at the topend, and irrigators receive 
and become accustomed to liberal and continuous issues. Later, 
as the tailend is developed, topenders have already established 
customary access to more than the share of water implied in 
the original planning, and they are able to retain this access 
not least because of their physical position near the source. 
It is thus notorious that topenders commonly receive more water 
than is needed for crop growth ana receive it more continuously 
than necessary. Conversely, those in'the lower reaches of 
command areas suffer from small, unreliable and untimely 
deliveries, where indeed they receive any water at all. 
That it is physically possible to redistribute water from the suggested 
head to the tails is / by what is sometimes achieved when 
monsoons fail and water is short. It is quite common then for 
issues to the head reaches to be curtailed and rotated so that 
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water can be directed towards the tailend to save a threatened 
crop. If the same control and rotation, issuing less to top-
enders, could be implemented in normal times, then tailenders 
should receive more water in a more reliable and timely fashion, 
likely 
and higher production and more equitable distribution would/be 
achieved (Chambers 19 80). 
The extent of this potential may vary considerably. Evidence 
from two trials in the Philippines suggests that in some cases 
at least it may be very large indeed. In both cases staff from 
the International Rice Research Institute 
/ and from the National Irrigation Administration collaborated 
in tightening up the scheduling of water issues and in directing 
more water towards the tail. In the first case (Valera and 
Wickham 1976) , on Lateral C of the Penaranda River Irrigation 
System, an area of about 5,700 ha., dry season production 
in 1975 
for the lateral as a whole/was estimated to be 97 percent up on 
the base year of 1973, with gains for the four main sections 
from head to tail of 23, 69, 154 and 1,494 percent respectively. 
All gained, but the tailenders gained most dramatically. In 
the second case (Early 1979), on the Lower Talavera Irrigation 
System, increased production was reported of about 60 percent 
comparing a benchmark year with the following year. The 
percentage increases were 94 and 62 for two topend laterals, 
16 and 10 for two middle laterals, and an average of 104 for 
three tailend laterals. Yields levelled up at the topend and 
tailend, having previously been highest in the middle. 
Two examples from India are less clearcut, because not from 
an 'experimental' situation and because of problems in using 
official statistics to estimate costs and benefits in each 
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case. In one, water scarcity was induced administratively. 
The canal (in Andhra Pradesh) had a potential cultivable 
command area of 112,000 acres but by 1976, some 10 years after 
water had first been made available, only 75 percent of the 
potential was being irrigated. Part of the reason for the short-
fall had to do with the large area of unauthorised paddy in the 
upper reaches, which had the consequence (1) that zoned 
('localised') land at the tailend of distributories received 
either no water at all or so irregularly that farmers did not 
want to risk irrigated crops, and (2) that some tailend areas 
suffered from water logging and salinity where large expanses 
of unauthorised paddy were being grown higher up. However no 
serious attempt to cut back on unauthorised paddy was made until 
the beginning of kharif 1976. The following year the second 
stage of the command area was due to be opened, adding another 
140,000 zoned acres to the first stage's 112,000 acres, and 
there were serious fears about the adequacy of water supply for 
the enlarged command area. By resolute administrative tightening 
of controls over water releases aid enforcement of existing regu-
lations, a large extension of unauthorised paddy in the head-
reaches was eliminated, and where.it had been growing on 
land zoned for lightly irrigated crops (as opposed to land zoned 
for no irrigated crop), a lightly irrigated crop was grown 
instead; elsewhere too a substitution of lightly irrigated 
crops for paddy took place, and several thousand acres which had 
suffered from waterlogging showed no sign of it and grew an 
irrigated crop for the first time in years. Details on the 
outcome and on how it was achieved have been described elsewhere 
(Wade 19 78), and here it is sufficient to note that it owed 
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much to the conjunction of a new, interested and determined 
Collector, a new and equally interested and determined Super-
intending Engineer, and the support of the local Minister, whose 
constituency lay towards the tailend of the first stage. 
involving 
In a second case, / another Andhra Pradesh canal irrigating 
over 300,000 acres a year, a water crisis caused by drought 
in the middle of the first season led to a sharp, temporary 
tightening of water issues, by means of which the shortfall 
was distributed more evenly than would otherwise have been the 
case and aggregate production, as well as equity, was almost 
certainly higher. This was achieved especially through the 
introduction, for the first time ever in the canal's 100-year 
history, of a rotational delivery schedule for the canal as a 
whole, accompanied by a sharp increase in management effort. 
This case demonstrates that the level of utilisation of a given 
set of control structures can be much higher than the normal, 
and therefore that large and expensive rehabilitation of 
physical structures is not a necessary condition before 
institutional improvement can be attempted (Wade 1980). 
There are dangers in generalising from these examples. In the 
two Philippine cases, flooding was a problem at the topends, and 
topenders could gain through water control with more sensitive 
management; this may not apply to the same extent in semi-arid 
or arid conditions. In addition pilot projects and experiments 
such as the Philippines' cases are liable to receive special 
managerial inputs and treatment, and may be difficult to replicate. 
Further, the Indian examples indicate not merely the potential, 
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but also the administrative and political difficulties of imple-
menting and sustaining redistribution. It is also true that 
physical structures may present constraints (such as the absence 
of cross-regulators, and eroded banks and silted channels). But 
all these qualifications and caveats can too easily obscure the 
main point. The evidence suggests that without large expenditure 
on physical structures, but with changes in the distribution of 
water on main systems, large increases in production may be 
achieved, with equity benefits to deprived tailenders as well. 
In India alone, the potential is probably for millions of tons 
of additional foodgrains. The argument aid evidence indicate that 
to achieve such a quantum jump in production, main system 
management is the key. 
If the potential is so large, why is it not widely recognised? 
Six explanations interlock: 
(i) Visibility 
Deficiencies in community-level and on-farm management are more 
visible than shortcomings in main system distribution. It is 
at these lower levels that bad water management is most manifest, 
in the form of profligate water applications, failures to 
construct or maintain ditches, flooding, water pouring into 
drains, a few powerful farmers taking more water and depriving 
the weaker, and so on. These are phenomena which can be seen on 
a field visit to a single location, and which can become fixed 
in the mind of the observer. In contrast, irregularity, 
unpredictability, and inconvenience in main system supplies 
of water to an outlet cannot be seen in the same way; they 
occur over distances of canals, and over periods of time. They 
can be 'inspected' only through records or through interviews, 
and both are secondary sources, often of doubtful reliability. 
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(ii) Professional concerns and preferences 
Each discipline has its own predilections for research, diagnosis 
and action. Engineers are trained in construction and are 
predisposed professionally to see problems and potential in 
terms of physical works rather than in the timing, location and 
amounts of water distributed. Agronomists are trained in crop 
biology and study crop water requirements; their eyes focus 
on plants, and especially plants in controlled conditions on 
research stations.rather than plants subject to the vagaries 
of on-farm water supply. Economists think in terms of costs 
and benefits, and are inclined to recommend regulation through 
water pricing. Sociologists study water 
questions at the community level but not on the main system. 
But in between the areas illuminated by these disciplines there 
is a dark space. There is no professional discipline for main 
system management. 
(iii) Blaming the farmer 
Concern with farm-level water management, and with community-
level institutions below the outlet, can indeed, be seen in 
psychological terms as an act of projection. Rather than 
self-critical introspection, leading to reform of main system 
management, professional actors project the blame onto 
irrigators and see the solution in 'farmer education'. Pro-
fessionals are, after all, highly trained and knowledgeable; 
farmers are poorly trained and appear ignorant. It may then 
seem self-evident that 'water wastage' and 'bad water manage-
ment' at the farm level can be attributed to that ignorance. 
But if the water supply to the outlet is inappropriate, this 
diagnosis, though convenient and reassuring, is wrong. 
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(iv) Water is politics 
The allocation and appropriation of any scarce resource is 
political, and irrigation water is no exception. Unfortunately, 
technical disciplines, partly from self-defence, treat water 
allocation as though it were a purely technical matter. In 
consequence, the real world of influence, inducements and threats 
is left out of the analysis. From this it follows that 
political solutions to political problems are overlooked. It 
may well be that the priority for institutional development is 
often not below the outlet but above it, in the creation of 
institutional means by which irrigation groups or communities 
can represent and manage conflicts of interest in an overt 
political process legitimately linked to the bureaucratic process. 
(v) The belief that one man's gain must be another man's loss 
Even if main system distribution is diagnosed as an 
opportunity, analysts may shy away from suggesting reform 
because they believe that productive and/or powerful topenders 
must lose if tailenders are to gain. After all, water which 
they would have received will be reallocated and redirected 
to benefit others. Topenders may indeed sometimes have to lose, 
they are 
/receiving sparing issues, well-spaced, there may be little 
scope, short of a change in cropping patterns, for them to 
receive less without losing. But if as is normal they are 
receiving liberal issues, the very abundance of water may, 
even if they do not recognise it, be to their disadvantage. 
Each case should be examined on its own merits. But it can be 
noted that in the Philippine examples, all cultivators, 
topenders included, apparently gained. There may be trade-
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here 
offs/between quantity of water, and reliability and predict-
ability of its supply. Valera and Wickham recorded of their 
Philippines experiment that 
'Farmers in the upper reaches of the lateral gradually 
came to support the new scheme once they were assured 
of an adequate share of water even in times of 
water shortage' (1976:4). 
Water reform need not necessarily be like land reform, in 
which the rich have to give something up. The game may be 
non-zero sum. Topenders may gain more through a reliable and 
predictable supply than they lose from getting less in quantity. 
In such cases, the political obstacles to improving main system 
management should be sharply reduced. 
(vi) Little incentive to canal operators 
Canal managers have little incentive to allocate water so as 
to capture the full economic, gains from efficient use, even 
though the gains would be large. This lack of incentive has 
two dimensions. First, the form of organisation within which 
they work is usually a civil service department. The norms 
and regulations of these departments do not lend themselves to 
providing incentives in the form of financial rewards or prestige 
for improving the economic efficiency of irrigation systems. 
Second, the potential of water allocation to generate conflict 
is unusually large. Water is valuable to irrigators but 
unambiguous ownership rights are difficult to establish. More-
over, the problem is spread over time since continuous or nearly 
continuous supplies of water are needed, in contrast with, say, 
seeds or fertiliser which are supplied only once in a crop 
season. There are therefore pressures on canal managers to 
allocate water so as to minimise conflict and trouble for 
themselves. Generally this prompts highly permissive releases 
in the upper reaches with consequent starvation in the tails, 
even though, as we have argued, farmers in the upper reaches 
might in some conditions gain, or at least not lose, from less 
permissive but more predictable releases. 
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These six factors provide a starting point for thinking about 
why main system operation has been so neglected in recent dis-
cussion. Main system operation and the design of appropriate 
management structures were, however, given attention 80 years 
ago in India, by the members of the first Indian Irrigation 
Commission in their Report of 1901-03. That a change has taken 
place can be seen by comparing their report with that of the 
National Irrigation Commission of 1972; there, main system 
operation is scarcely mentioned as a problem. Reports are only 
reports; but-the central strategy for improving canal irrigation 
in India today appears to accept the same three assumptions which 
underlie current irrigation orthodoxy internationally (though 
with some notable, if still partial, exceptions, as in Andhra 
Pradesh). It must be sobering for any would-be reformer to note 
that the blind spot has got worse, not better, over the past 
seven or eight decades; but it is also encouraging, since it 
reinforces the view that, precisely because of this, main 
system operation now presents a major opportunity. 
To begin/to explore and realise the potential from improved 
main system management requires two thrusts. 
The first is cognitive. The three reports cited at the beginning 
of the paper were highly professional; they were, in fact, too 
highly professional. For since no profession is closely con-
cerned with water distribution on main systems, that set of 
concerns was simply not raised. The challenge now is to enable 
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engineers and others to regard main system scheduling and 
distribution as professionally exciting, satisfying and 
rewarding. In the long term this may require new training for 
a new profession. In the short term, the question is whether 
those engaged in irrigation management can themselves raise 
the status of water distribution as a professional concern. 
This suggests that immediate attention should be given by 
national governments and international agencies to in-service 
training for canal operators, to the reform of university and 
diploma syllabi, and to the writing of textbooks on canal 
operation (atpresent virtually hon-existent). 
The second thrust is diagnostic. Can methods be devised for 
quickly and correctly identifying feasible changes in water 
distribution? Feasibility here must relate to the existing 
physical structures, to the extent to which conflict can be 
avoided by enabling all or most irrigators to gain from change, 
and to the institutional capability of the bureaucracy to 
implement a changed pattern of water distribution, preferably 
with collective involvement of irrigators. If such methods can 
be devised, used and evaluated, it should be possible to gauge 
more clearly the scale of the potential from improved system 
management. There is at least a chance that they might unlock 
a set of changes which would transform the productivity ana 
equity of canal irrigation much more widely. With over 
20 million hectares under canal irrigation in India alone, 
the stakes are so high that the case for an attempt is compelling. 
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